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I.  INTRODUCTION
A.  Popular  Constitutionalism
In a world of popular constitutionalism, would  it occur to anyone
to notice or to mention any difference between enumerated  and un-
enumerated  constitutional  rights?  Would  the  distinction  matter  in
any way, to anyone?  If so,  to whom,  how, and why?  That is  my ques-
tion.
A world  of popular  constitutionalism  is  not, as  I  conceive  it,  a
world void of constitutional rights.  (If it were,  my question would be
moot.)  In  the world  I have in mind and ask you to  envision, there is
no lack of commitment to a constitutional  law that imposes limits and
requirements on political actors, some of them correlating with rights
held by individuals and groups.  To the contrary, this is a world where
claims of constitutional  rights are  taken  seriously and  are  widely be-
lieved to make  a difference,  sometimes, both for what public officials
decide to do and for how citizens respond  to what they do.  What dis-
tinguishes  this world  from our world  is that the  claiming  takes place
outside the courts, in venues to which the people at large  have as full
and continuous an access as our system of representative  government
ever affords.  In a world of popular constitutionalism,  constitutional-
rights talk is a fixture in the political culture, but with no expectation
that courts will set aside,  ignore, or nullify procedurally  regular  legis-
lative  enactments,  or other acts of government,  on grounds  of sub-
stantive  unconstitutionality.  In  this  world,  there  are  (at  any  rate,
there can  be) constitutional rights but there is no sign of government
by judiciary.
It is controversial-needless  to  say-whether such  a combination
makes  much  practical  sense  or will  work  to  a  country's  advantage,
moral  or prudential.  (Some may deny that it is even conceptually vi-
Robert  Walmsley University  Professor,  Harvard  University.  I am  indebted  for  excellent
comments-including  some to which  I could not do justice within  the bounds of this article-to
John  Manning,  to  other participants  in  this  Symposium,  and  to  participants  in the  Constitu-
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able.)  Such  controversy is beside  the point of my undertaking here.
I come neither to praise nor to bury popular constitutionalism; popu-
lar constitutionalism  is not my target, it is  my foil.  I use  the idea  to
help me stage an  inquiry into a different debate,  the one that breaks
out from  time  to  time over  the  category of unenumerated  constitu-
tional rights.  I seek clarification of the stakes in that debate.  Specifi-
cally,  I want  to know whether anything might be at stake beyond  the
separation-of-powers  concerns  that  classically  spring up  when  courts
brandish unenumerated  rights  to justify  their interventions  into po-
litical affairs.  My strategy is  to sidetrack  those  concerns by assuming
constitutional-rights  talk in  the absence ofjudicial  review, and asking
whether there then remains any imaginable reason for differentiating
constitutional  rights into  "enumerated" and "unenumerated" classes,
or for looking at one  or the other class  with  a jaundiced  eye.  If we
notice any such reason  or reasons, using vision  thus disencumbered
of separation-of-powers  worries,  then  those  might  still be  real  con-
cerns after plugging judicial review back into the picture.
B.  Which Debate?
I  said  my  aim  was  to  clarify  the  stakes  in  the  "unenumerated
rights"  debate,  but which  debate  is  that exactly?  As  papers  in  this
symposium make  evident,  talk of unenumerated  rights  can  set  off a
number of different debates, and I need to specify which one of these
I have in mind.
We  can start with the  "unwritten-constitution" debate, so  to name
it.  Let us use  "Constitution of the  United  States" as a  proper  name
for a certain body of enacted laws that we all know how to identify  (as-
suming any professed uncertainties  about the 27th Amendment have
by now been settled).'  We can call this positive-legal object "CUS" for
short.  Then  we  can  ask:  Is  CUS  the  only  constitution  Americans
have,  or do we  also have  alongside  it an  "unwritten" constitution, an
additional  body  of norms  to  which  anyone  pressing  or  deciding  a
claim of constitutional right can properly have recourse?  That is  the
unwritten-constitution  debate,  and it  occurs  on  the  terrains  of ana-
lytical jurisprudence, moral  theory, and legal sociology  (to which  his-
I  See  PAUL  BREST  ET  AL.,  PROCESSES  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  DECISIONMAKING:  CASES  AND
MATERIALS  478-81  (2006)  (describing  and  examining  doubts  regarding  the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment).
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tory, obviously,  is not irrelevant) . It is a question,  at bottom, about
the content of the rule of recognition in the American  legal system.
Then  we  have  what  I  shall  call  the  "correct-readings"  debates.
Suppose  it is  settled that CUS  is the  only constitution  we have.  CUS
contains  prohibitions  against  state-authored  deprivations  of life,  lib-
erty,  and  property  without  due  process  of law.  Are  these  prohibi-
tions, or are they not, correctly taken  to impose substantive  limits on
government?5   And  what  of  the  Reconstruction  era  privileges-or-
immunities  clause 6 and  the  Ninth  Amendment?  They  certainly  are
parts  of CUS.  Are  they  or are  they not correctly  read, separately  or
together, to incorporate  by reference  a substantive  content compara-
ble to what some authorities  might attribute to an unwritten constitu-
tion?7  Those  are  the  correct-readings  debates.  They  occur  on the
terrain  of dispute  over modes  of exegesis for  CUS and possibly also,
depending  on what  mode  one  endorses,  on  the  terrains  of history
and moral theory.
The  unenumerated-rights  debate  that  I  have  in  mind  is  distinct
from  both  the  unwritten-constitution  and  the  correct-readings  de-
bates.  Appeals  to unenumerated constitutional  rights instigate a fur-
ther  debate,  which  resolutions  of the others  do not resolve.  To see
this,  all you  need do is assume-and  as someone  tuned in  to Ameri-
can  constitutional-legal  discourse  you  will  not  find  this  a  mind-
stretching  assumption-that  CUS  is indeed  the only constitution  we
have,  but also  that  the  Due  Process  Clauses  do  throw some  sort of
protective  mantle around people's  interests in  life, liberty, and prop-
erty,  of a  kind  that does  impose substantive  restraints  on legislative
and  other governmental  choices.  The unenumerated-rights  debate
that I  am trying to isolate for inspection is the  one that arises even af-
ter those propositions are taken for granted, as of course they simply
are in everyday American  legal thought and practice.
The routine assumption of lawyers  is that if (contrary  to fact) CUS
contained  no  substantive  limits  on  government,  then  (contrary  to
fact)  no  finding  of a  substantive  constitutional  right  could  compe-
tently be made.  (Try getting confirmed for a federal judgeship while
2 Contributions  to the  debate  include Thomas  C.  Grey,  Do  We Have an Unwritten Constitu-
tion?, 27  STAN. L.  REV. 703  (1975);  Michael  S. Moore,  Do We  Have an Unwritten Constitution?,  63
S. CAL. L.  REV.  107  (1989);  and Suzanna Sherry,  The Founders' Unwritten Constitution,  54 U.  CHI.
L. REV. 1127  (1987).
3  See generally Kent  Greenawalt,  The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution,  85  MICH.  L. REV.
621  (1987)  (considering  how closely the  Constitution of the  United States fits the  notion of a
rule of recognition in the jurisprudential theory of H.L.A. Hart).
4  See U.S. CONST. amend. V;  id. amend. XIV,  §  1.
5  See, e.g., James  w.  Ely, Jr.,  "To pursue any lawful trade or avocation": The Evolution of Unenu-
merated Economic Rights in  the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 917  (2006).
6  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §  1.
7  See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Who's Afraid of Unenumerated  Rights?, 9  U. PA.J. CONST.  L.  1 (2006).JOURNAL  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW
denying that every competent finding in favor of someone's  claim  to
a constitutional right has to be connected by some form of reasoning
and inference  to what can  be read  in  CUS!)  And yet  the discourse
also routinely sorts  established,  substantive  constitutional  rights  into
categories  of "enumerated" and  "unenumerated."  And  now we  are
on the verge of the key observation,  the one  that  makes this matter
into  a  debate, to  wit:  The  class  of rights  stamped  "unenumerated"
definitely, as John Orth  says,'  bears  a stigma in relation  to  the other
class.  In  other words, debate  persists  over the  propriety of claiming
and  finding  inside  CUS  a  set  of  rights  that  are  not  enumerated
therein.  It is that debate which occupies this article.
C.  The Course of the Argument
But then what, after all, are we talking about?  What could people
be  getting at-what worry  or  bias  could  they  be  venting,  what itch
could  they be scratching--with  talk about rights claimed and found
inside a written  constitution,  which  that constitution  does not  "enu-
merate?"  To make the question more concrete:  In what way that gets
under people's  skin is the liberty right in Moore v. East Clevelana' less
enumerated than the speech right in  Texas v. Johnson?"'
My response  comes  in two parts,  the first of which-found in Part
II-is the easier to get across,  and also  provides  the take-off point for
my query about what becomes of our categories  in a world of popular
constitutionalism.  Briefly,  my suggestion  is that this way of talking-
"enumerated"/"unenumerated"-is  one that arises specifically within
a  set of beliefs  about the proper  place  and role  of an independent
8  SeeJohn  V. Orth,  The Enumeration of Rights: "Let Me Count the Ways, " 9 U.  PA.J.  CONST. L.
281  (2006).
8  431  U.S.  494 (1977)  (finding-roughly-in favor of a claimed constitutional  right of free-
dom to provide  in  one's residence a home for members  of one's extended family).
10 491  U.S.  397  (1989)  (finding in favor of a claimed constitutional  right not to be punished
or otherwise sanctioned or burdened  for burning an American  flag  (which one owns) as an act
of political  expression);  see RONALD  DWORKIN,  LIFE'S  DOMINION  130-31  (1993)  (making use of
Texas to show that "no fact about the correct use of language  can explain  the supposed distinc-
tion between enumerated and unenumerated  constitutional rights").
Note  that the question  does not disappear  when  one observes  that the holding  in  Texas is
based not on some stretching of the term "speech" beyond its core signification  to make  it cover
acts of flag-burning, but rather on a constructive  theory of the meaning and purpose of the free
speech  guarantee.  That observation  surely  is  correct.  The  question,  though,  is  the one  that
arises when we observe that the holding in Moore is no less (and no more!)  obviously based on a
constructive  theory of the meaning and purpose of the liberty guarantee, and not on any simple
claim  that the term  "liberty" just happens  to "cover" what  Inez Moore was  doing.  That being
plainly the case, why do we  blithely call  the Texas right "enumerated" and  the Moore right "un-
enumerated?"  That is  the question  I  am  after.  In  posing that question,  it  seems  germane  to
point  out-as  I  do, see infra text accompanying  notes 32-35-that  if the  relative  absence  of a
need-to-stretch  were to be taken  as  the measure  of what does and does not deserve  the accolade
"enumerated," the Texas/Moore pair would be inexplicable.  See DWORKIN,  supra.
[Vol.  9:1Oct. 2006] UNENUMERA TED RIGHTS UNDER POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM  125
judiciary  in  a constitutional  democracy.  It  is  a  peculiarly American
way  of talking, and it seems  plainly connected  to worries about judi-
cial review.  Evidently, we are prone to feel that courts are on thinner
ice when they find in favor of claims to rights that fall in the "unenu-
merated" class.  My speculation  here accords with  suggestions raised
by essays in this symposium that the "unenumerated" card gets played
when  some  ideological  contender  feels able  by  doing  so  to  stir up
doubts about the propriety of some contested line of intervention by
the  Supreme  Court into the conduct of public affairs."  If so, then it
is natural to ask, as I do, whether the notion of unenumerated  consti-
tutional  rights  would  register  at  all  in  a  world  in  which  no  court
dreams of intervening on behalf of constitutional rights, enumerated
or not.
But still we evade the puzzle about what we are talking about when
we  talk of unenumerated  constitutional rights.  To say we Americans
are prone to feeling uneasy about judicial findings  of unenumerated
constitutional rights is not even  to begin to explain what we think dif-
ferentiates  enumerated  from  unenumerated,  when  everyone  starts
from the premise  that all possible  constitutional rights are rights  that
can  be  read  out  of CUS  by  some  allowable  process  of reading.  I
tackle  that puzzle  in Part III.  I  start by connecting  the  popularity of
the distinction to the fact, as I take it to be, that few of us stand at all
times safely beyond the reach and the tug of a set of ideas about legal-
ity that I call "minimal legal formalism"-roughly,  the ideas that legal
judgments  (just in  order to be  legal ones)  are judgments  controlled
by laws laid down in advance of those judgments, and that those laws
exert their control  over legal judgments  by saying what  they say and
not saying something different.
But that only sharpens the challenge  of explaining how any cogni-
zable  American  constitutional  rights can be other than  enumerated.
How can  a finding in favor of a claimed constitutional  right be read
out of CUS without a finding that CUS says the right exists?  And how
can CUS  say any such thing without enumerating the right?  Keeping
Moore and  Texas as  my  examples,  and  taking a  cue from John  Hart
Ely, 2  I  ask:  In what way  does the  First Amendment's  speech  clause
"mark as special"  a "value" encompassing flag-burning,  in  which the
Fourteenth Amendment's  liberty clause  does not "mark as special"  a
"value" encompassing free choice of household formation?
1 See Ken  I. Kersch,  Everything is Enumerated:  The Developmental Past and Future of an Interpre-
tive Problem, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L.  957  (2006);  Mark Tushnet,  Can You  Watch  Unenumerated  Rights
Drift?, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 209 (2006).
12 SeeJohn  Hart Ely,  The  Wages of Crying Wolf.  A  Comment on Roe v. Wade,  82  YALE L.J. 920,
943  (1973)  (suggesting that a court overturning  a statute on constitutional  grounds should  be
able  to "defend  its decision  in terms of inferences  from  values  the Constitution  marks  as  spe-
cial").JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
In  response,  I  try  in  Part  III  to  deduce  what  people who  think
there  really  is  a  difference  here must  think.  They  must think  that
there  is  a  distinctively  legal form  of argument-a  form  of argument
that is not simply and merely political,  and is not simply and merely philoso-
phical (because judges are  not supposed to  dictate on  merely political
grounds, or on  merely philosophical  grounds) 1
3-which  form of argu-
ment connects  the First Amendment's  "freedom of speech"  locution
to  the  flag-burning  right  but  does  not  connect  the  Fourteenth
Amendment's  "liberty" locution to  free  choice  in  household forma-
tion.
1 4
I  call  that  presupposed  form  of  argument  "standard  legal
method."  I  make no claim to  know concretely what that form  of ar-
gument is or to be  able to describe  it.  I  neither affirm nor deny the
existence  or  the possibility  of this putative  form  of argument.  I  say
only that anyone reporting a strong sense that there's a difference  in
the prima facie legitimacy  or credibility of the judicial findings of the
flag-burning  right  and  the  extended-family-living  right, in  terms  of
one's being enumerated  and the other not, is presupposing  the exis-
tence of this standard legal method.
I  thus  bring out a  set  of beliefs  that  I  say  must accompany  talk
about  enumerated  and  unenumerated  constitutional  rights,  of  the
kind  that  insinuates  relative  disparagement  of  the  latter  class.
Thenceforward  I  accept  these  beliefs  as  given.  Suppose-my  query
goes-that these are our beliefs  (and to be honest I doubt that many
of us are  ever entirely  free of them).  In  a world without judicial  re-
view-in  a  world  of popular  constitutionalism-would  we,  holding
these  beliefs,  see  anything  problematic  about  claims  to  unenumer-
ated constitutional  rights,  meaning rights  that  cannot  be connected
to  CUS,  through  a finding of what CUS  says when  read correctly, by
any distinguishably legal-not-merely-political  form of argument?
I first cast the  question in  terms of concerns on behalf of democ-
racy  or  government  by  the  people.  My  answer,  in  Part  IV,  comes
down  to four propositions.  First, if you mean  by democracy  what  a
follower of Alexander Bickel would mean, then there certainly can be
constitutional rights that constrict democracy  excessively,  even  in the
13  See Michel  Rosenfeld,  The Rule of Law  and the Legitimacy of Constitutional  Democracy, 74  S.
CAL.  L. REv.  1307, 1344  (2001)  (distinguishing  between  the propositions  that law is "political"
and that law is "mere politics," and attributing normative significance  to the distinction).
14 Again  I want  to emphasize  that I am  not suggesting  that the connection  has to consist in
broadening  the reference  of a term  ("speech,"  "liberty")  to make  it cover non-core cases.  The
connection  can just as well consist in application of a constructive theory of the respective  pur-
poses and meanings of the implicated clauses or, if you like,  of the directly implicated  clauses
construed "structurally" or "intertextually" with the rest of CUS.  See generally CHARLES L. BLACK,
STRUCTURE  AND  RELATIONSHIP  IN CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  (1986); Akhil Reed  Amar, Intertextual-
ism,  112 HARv. L. REv.  747  (1999).
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absence ofjudicial  review.  However, second, on Bickel's conception of
democracy,  a  division  of constitutional  rights  between  enumerated
and unenumerated  fails  to  correlate  with  a  division  between  those
constitutional rights that do, and those that do not, constrict democ-
racy  unduly.  Third, if you  mean  by  democracy  what  a  follower  of
Bruce Ackerman would mean,  then constitutional  rights  do not con-
strict democracy, assuming a certain condition is satisfied.  But fourth,
the condition is that unenumerated constitutional rights are inadmis-
sible.
Finally, in Part V, I  raise the question of how liberal  contractarian
theories of political justification  and legitimacy would  respond to the
enumerated/unenumerated  classification  for  constitutional  rights in
a world without judicial  review.  For that, I shall have  to show first-
and this is not hard-that liberal contractarian theories of legitimacy
do not logically or conceptually  exclude  the possibility of dispensing
with judicial review.  I then go on to show that these theories must re-
ject the idea of subdividing constitutional rights into enumerated and
unenumerated  classes,  because-notwithstanding  possible  first  ap-
pearances  to the contrary-in the sight of these  theories all  constitu-
tional rights are unenumerated.  All  are,  and must be,  outcroppings
of something akin to  the famous  "rational continuum"  of Poe v.  UU1-
15 man.
II.  UNENUMERATED  CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW, "UBIUS," AND THE SEPARATION  OF
POWERS
A.  Justiciability  and Separation of Powers
A common worry about unenumerated  constitutional rights-call
this  the  Standard Worry-presupposes  the  institution  of judicial  re-
view.  It also  presupposes attachment to the idea-a key component
in what Robin West dubs  "the legal question  doctrine"-that  to  clas-
sify an obligation as one of law is ipso facto to make the obligation one
to  be  enforced  by  the judiciary  against  noncomplying  addressees.
6
By classing a claim as "constitutional" you also class it as "legal" and so
willy-nilly make the independent judiciary responsible for its effectua-
tion:  Ubi ius, ibi remedium.  And  that means-this being,  after all,  a
constitutional  sort of a claim-that courts  will be  expected  to  effectu-
ate  the  claim  against  electorally  accountable,  political  branches  of
15 367 U.S. 497, 523  (1961)  (Harlan, J, dissenting).
16  Robin West,  Unenumerated  Duties, 9 U. PA.J. CONsT.  L. 221  (2006); see also Frank I. Michel-
man,  The  Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political  Justification, 1 INT'LJ.  CONST.  L.  13,  19
(2003)  (questioning the bond between constitutional guarantees and judicial enforcement).JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
government  when  the  latter fail  to  comply sua  sponte.  But judicial
oversight  of  the  conduct  of government  by  those  branches,  under
cover of claims  that are  not certifiably authorized by identifiable,  an-
tecedently existent constitutional  laws,  strains or blurs a line between
legal and political decision-making that is foundational for a constitu-
tional democracy.  Thus  runs  the Standard  Worry about  unenumer-
ated  constitutional  rights.  The  term  implies,  as John Orth  says,  "an
addition  to  the  constitutional  text  without  compliance  with  the
amendment process" scripted in Article V.
17
Of course,  we  have  already noticed  that even  where  no formally
identifiable  piece of constitutional law spells out in haec verba the exis-
tence  of any right, say of freedom  to burn a flag or to use contracep-
tion, 8 a court concluding in favor of such a constitutional  right's exis-
tence may do so  (or at any rate purport to do so)  not by going outside
the constitution  viewed as law  laid down  ("CUS")-say,  to an unwrit-
ten constitution-but  rather by applying  to  that laid-down  constitu-
tional law some accepted-as-standard  legal method  ("SLM")  for figur-
ing  out what  formally  recognized  legal  materials  say.  The  method
may be  as fancy, as muscular, as deeply tinged by trans-textual factors
as you like;  as long as it is cognizable  as SLM,  the Standard Worry is
beached.  The judicial finding  then  is  certifiably  legal and  thus  not
political  in  the sense  of not required by law, for surely  "law" encom-
passes  the employment of SLM.  And here, then, is what follows:  the
Standard  Worry about  unenumerated constitutional  rights is-it must
be-a worry  about judicial  findings  of constitutional  rights  that  do
not  or  cannot  claim  the  backing  of an  application  of a commonly
recognized  SLM to words and sentences  found in recognized consti-
tutional  laws.  The  central case-but it need  not be the only one-
occurs when the judicial finding floats completely free of any claim to
have located in CUS any words or sentences that "mark" certain  "val-
ues" as  "special,"'9 whether taken one by one or combined into struc-
tures and relationships.
2 0
B.  Fighting "Ubi Ius"
Not  everyone  subscribes  to  the  legal  question  doctrine  or  is
caught within  its grip.  For anyone  who does  not and  is not, talk of
constitutional  law and constitutional  rights  without judicial  enforce-
ment can make perfectly good sense.
17 Orth, supra note 8.
18 See  Griswold v.  Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479  (1965)  (finding a right for married  couples  to
use contraception within "the penumbra  of specific  guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
19  Ely, supra note 12.
20 See authorities cited supra  note  14.
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Suppose  we  have  in  mind a  norm, N, to which  we  wish  state offi-
cials  to conform.  Maybe,  for some reason,  we do not expect or wish
our judiciary  to  get too  much mixed  up  with  enforcing  compliance
with  N.  (Anyone  who  has  thought much  about  the  question  of in-
cluding  social  and  economic  rights  or guarantees  in  a  constitution
can easily fill in the blanks.)2  Still, we may want to say that Nis meant
to be fully binding and obligatory on those state officials to whom it is
addressed.  Indeed we  want to  say N is binding in just the ways,  and
for just the reasons-whatever  they may be-that laws  in general are
understood  to be binding even at moments  when they are not being
externally enforced.  Granted, no one can  follow a law without inter-
preting  it to  determine  the  tenor  of its  application  to  the  matter  at
hand.  Granted,  interpretive  choices  are often  open to fair and rea-
sonable disagreement.  Granted, matters of the greatest moment may
sometimes  depend  on which  among  two  or more  reasonably  enter-
tainable interpretations  the interpreter may settle upon.  Still, there is
a  vast  difference  between  interpreting  N  and  disregarding  N.  We
want to say that addressees are not meant to have a free choice about
heeding N, and furthermore  that an addressee  who  simply flouts  N,
without special excuse or  justification,  is blamable for contempt of law
in the same way that anyone who flouts the law is blamable.  How can
we say these things, if we cannot call Na law?
So we  reject the view that a  norm  demanding respect for certain
rights  by state  officials,  including  ordinary  lawmakers-it  would  be,
then, a norm of constitutional  import-cannot count as law without its
being turned over to judges for enforcement.  We deny that constitu-
tional law enforced by judges has to be all the constitutional law there
is or that matters. 2  We  maintain that constitutional  law  outside  the
courts can figure importantly in the conduct of public affairs.  We in-
sist that contention outside the courts over constitutional-legal  mean-
ings and obligations very possibly can be a politically cogent activity, a
site  for  republican  or  democratic  politics  in  action. 23  Is  there  any
conceivable  reason  why  anyone  who  takes  this  view  should  worry
about  allowing  into  the  discourse  a  class  of unenumerated  constitu-
tional  rights,  meaning  rights  whose  existence  cannot  be  warranted
without resort  to forms  of argument that strike  many or most as  not
21  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence  G.  Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:  Rflections on the  Thinness of Constitu-
tional Law, 88  NW.  U.  L.  REV.  410,  412-29  (1993)  (reviewing  reasons  for  "judicial underen-
forcement" of such  rights by courts affirming their existence).
Lawrence  Sager  has  offered cogent  reasons  for taking  such  a  position.  See  id. at 428-35
(reviewing reasons why it is  best to "recognize  that the Constitution extends  beyond the  reach
of its judicial enforcement").
23  See  LARRY  D.  KRAMER,  THE  PEOPLE  THEMSELVES:  POPULAR  CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND
JUDICIAL  REVIEW  (2004); MARK  TUSHNET,  TAKING  THE CONSTITUTION  AWAY  FROM THE  COURTS
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distinctly legal-where "legal" means not (simply or merely)  political
or philosophical?
C.  If  "Ubi Ius" is Rejected?
The  Standard Worry  evaporates under popular constitutionalism.
To speak  more  strictly, it evaporates  if we  either discard judicial  re-
view-which  means  discarding  the  legal  question  doctrine,  too,  be-
cause the legal question doctrine  says, in effect, that there  can be  no S 24
constitutional rights without judicial review  -- or we discard the legal
question doctrine while still, for reasons of expediency or of habit, re-
taining judicial  review  for  some  but  maybe  not  all  constitutional
rights.  Where judicial review is totally absent  (or is  as close  to totally
absent  as  the  logic  of adjudication  within  a  legal  system  permits),  5
recognition of applicable  constitutional rights can occur only in ven-
ues where  politics  is  freely  admissible-legislative  chambers,  includ-
ing committee  hearings and floor  debates;  executive  offices and pro-
nouncements, including veto messages;16 election and ballot-question
campaigns.  No problem, then-or  so it first  appears-about claims
of constitutional  rights that can  be supported only by forms of argu-
ment  that admittedly  are  not distinctly  legal-not-merely-political  (or
legal-not-merely-philosophical,  etc.).  Nor  is there  any such  problem
if we  stick  with  relatively  wide-bodied  judicial  review,  but  only  for
prudential reasons and not because we think that anything legal must
be for the courts to enforce.  Courts then could refrain from  messing
around with unenumerated  constitutional rights, but legislatures,  ex-
ecutives, and the voting public could conjure  them to hearts' content
without overstepping,  stretching,  or eroding any  law/politics  bound-
ary.
Evaporation  of the Standard Worry under popular constitutional-
ism  does  not mean  there  would remain  no other ground  for worry
about  unenumerated  constitutional  rights.  We  are  going  to  turn
soon  to  the  question  of what  other sorts  of worries  might  crop  up.
But first we need to spend some time trying to pin down exactly what
lawyers  have in mind when talking of a class of "unenumerated" con-
stitutional rights to which-but not to a complementary class of "enu-
merated" constitutional rights-the Standard Worry attaches.
24  Any legal right begets judicial enforcement;  constitutional  rights are  legal rights that bind
ordinary  lawmakers; judicial  enforcement  of a  right against ordinary  lawmakers  is judicial  re-
view.
25  See Matthew  D. Adler & Michael  C. Doff, Constitutional  Existence Conditions and Judicial  Re-
view,  89 VA.  L.  REV.  1105,  1107-09  (2003)  (explaining  why judicial  review  can  never be  com-
pletely avoidable).
26  Setting aside  the  off-mainstream  view that the veto power  is not properly exercisable  ex-
cept in defense of the Constitution.
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III.  THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF "UNENUMERATED
CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS"
Anyone  engaged  in  debate  about  unenumerated  constitutional
rights  has  somewhere  in mind  an  idea  about what sort of a thing  a
constitutional  right is, and furthermore  about how to tell which ones
are enumerated and which are not.  That is what I am after here:  not
what  I  think  these  things  are  (constitutional  rights,  unenumerated
constitutional  rights)  but what I think those  who look with suspicion
on unenumerated  constitutional  rights  routinely-perhaps  necessar-
ily-think  they are.  I  offer  no  view about  whether  the  conceptual
analysis  to  follow  holds water  outside  the confines  of this  particular
field of debate.
We  can  safely  start  with  this:  An  unenumerated  constitutional
right is a kind of constitutional  right, and  a constitutional  right is  a
kind of legal right.  A  legal right is a right that would not exist, or be
recognized  to exist, but for the recognized existence  of some body of
law  that warrants  a finding of the  right's existence.  A  constitutional
right  is  a legal  right that binds  classes  of actors,  such  as  legislatures
engaged  in making ordinary  laws,  whom ordinary  laws  do not bind.
Hence,  all  constitutional  rights,  including  any  that  may  be  unenu-
merated,  are  rights that would  not exist,  or be  recognized  to  exist,
but for  the  recognized  existence  of a  compendium  of distinct  and
special  (non-ordinary) laws called the constitution.
To  that minimal  extent, at least,  talk  about constitutional  rights
buys into legal formalism:  We think that supporting a claim to a con-
stitutional right means pointing to some extant compendium  of laws
distinguishable  as  the constitution, the  existence of which  is the  con-
tingency  that  somehow  makes  the  difference  between  the  claimed
right's  existence  and  non-existence-in  favor  of existence.  If  the
right exists,  it exists  by virtue  of whatever  accounts  for the  constitu-
tion's  existence  as  law and  not otherwise.  Non-existence  is  the  de-
fault position for a claimed constitutional right, and it takes a consti-
tutional law to overcome the default.
The very  idea of constitutional  rights  routinely  (I  did not say nec-
essarily)  carries  at least that baggage.  And  yet,  as  we  have  noticed,
anyone  who  thinks  in that  minimally formalistic  way about  the cate-
gory  of constitutional  rights  will  soon come  to  the  following  puzzle
about  "unenumerated"  constitutional  rights:  How  can  the  recog-
nized existence of an extra-ordinary  law-the constitution-act as the
key  to  recognition  of a right's  existence,  if that law  does  not  "enu-
merate"  that right?  How can the constitution-as-law  be what redeems
the  claimed  constitutional  right from limbo  (the  default),  otherwise
than by saying that the right exists?  And how can the constitution-as-
law do that without "enumerating" the right?JOURNAL OF  CONS TITUTIONAL LA W
I believe  that relatively disparaging  talk about unenumerated  con-
stitutional  rights  can  make  everyday  sense  to  lawyers  only within  a
framework of thought that takes for granted all of the following:
(1) The  constitutional  rights of which we  speak are legal rights
of a special  kind, recognition of which  is, accordingly,  always a
matter for legaljudgment.  Thus, constitutional rights can exist
only by force of the recognized  existence  of a special and dis-
tinct sort of law identified  as a constitution  or a constitutional
law.  That is because...
(2)AIl  legal judgments-judgments  regarding  what  is  and  is
not lawful or according to law-result from applications of laws
that  exist  apart  from  and  antecedently  to  those judgments.
The  antecedently  existing  laws  that  thus  govern  legal judg-
ments consist of words and sentences, at least in part.  Laws ex-
ert at least some of their control over legal judgments by saying
what  they  say  and  not  saying  something  else.  We  can  leave
open whether laws  (or some might prefer  to  say "law" or "the
law")  also  have  non-verbal  or non-syntactical  roots  and ramifi-
cations  that can  sometimes  connect  them to  legal judgments.
Here  I  claim  only that the  notion  of "unenumerated"  (as  op-
posed  to "enumerated")  constitutional  rights cannot take wing
without a presupposition  that a possible-not to  say  the  com-
mon or the normal-way for law  to control legal judgments  is
for laws to say what they say and not something different.  (Else
all  rights  would  be  unenumerated,  which  would  destroy  our
topic.  Why  talk  about  black  crows  when  all  the  crows  are
black?)
(3) There  is an identifiable, standard legal method  ("SLM")  for
deciding what a given constitutional or other law does and does
not say.  The method may or may not be the same for constitu-
tional  laws as  for other laws.  Either way,  there  is  an  SLM  for
deciding whether  a  given  constitutional  law  does or  does  not
say that such-and-such  a right exists,  in a form  that benefits  or
satisfies the claimant, given the facts at hand.
(4) Responsible  deciders  (e.g., judges)  sometimes  return find-
ings of the  existence  of a constitutional  right in the claimant's
favor, which  they premise  on identified constitutional  laws  but
which they detectably or confessedly do not reach  by use of an
applicable SLM as in  (3).
(5) In our legal  culture, it is arguable that such findings some-
times merit respect as lawful or according to law.
My claim is that the set of findings described in  (4)  is and must be
equivalent to  the set of findings concerning  the existence  of unenu-
merated constitutional  rights.  Why  so?  Just because  every  recogni-
tion  of an  unenumerated  constitutional  right  is  supposed  to  be  at
least a tad problematic, in some way common to that class but foreign
to  the  complementary  class  of "enumerated" rights.  As John  Orth
says,  to draw the distinction  is already  to  "delegitimize" claims of un-
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enumerated  rights.2 7  Any first-time judicial finding of a  right classed
as unenumerated  will instinctively be felt, by lawyers and other atten-
tive  Americans-recent  academic  assaults  on  textualism  notwith-
standing 8-to  be  less  initially  entitled  to  presumptive  respect  than
will a first-time judicial finding of an ostensibly enumerated constitu-
tional  right  (to  burn  a flag,  to  spend without limit in  political  cam-
29 paigns,  to  have  a  Ten  Commandments  display  removed  from  the
courthouse  walls 3 0 )  that may  meet  comparably  heated  resistance  in
some quarters  of society.  (I  write  "first-time" and  "initially" in order
to  allow  for  the  acclimating  effects  of precedent-following  and  en-
trenchment over time.)  And yet there  can be nothing out-of-the-way
about  a  court's  use  of SLM  to  find  that an  acknowledged  constitu-
tional  law  says that such-and-such  a right exists in a claimant's  favor.
Whenever  a judicial finding of a constitutional right's existence regis-
ters as in some degree  irregular,  that must be because we judge  that
the  finding was  not reached, or could not have been reached,  by an
application  of SLM  to  a  recognized  constitutional  law. 3
'  And since
"unenumerated"  always  insinuates  irregular  in  some  degree  (what
other point  does  this usage  have?),  we can  conclude  that the set  of
findings  of  the  existence  of unenumerated  constitutional  rights  is
equivalent to the set of findings described  in (4).
Take again  the exemplary pair I mentioned before,  Texas v. John-
son 
3 2 and Moore v. East Cleveland.3  A grandmother's  freedom  to make
a  home  for  the  children  of more  than  one  of her  children  is  not
enumerated-so  established  usage  indicates-by way of "liberty";34 it
is,  if a constitutional  right at all, an unenumerated  one.  By contrast,
27  SeeOrth, supra note 8.
28  See Kersch, supra note 11.
29  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.  1 (1976)  (holding expenditure  limitations in  a federal  elec-
tion statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
30  See McCreary  County v. ACLU of Kentucky,  125  S.  Ct. 2722  (2005)  (holding that certain
displays of the  Ten Commandments  in courthouses  violated the Establishment Clause because
their purpose was to advance  religion).
31 Here  I note  that there are  two ways in which we  as observers might conclude that ajudge
or other  authority has reached  a finding  in favor of a claimed constitutional  right, but not by
applying SLM  to  a recognized  constitutional law.  First, we might see the judge  taking the view
that not all constitutional  rights (and maybe not any constitutional rights, and certainly not this
constitutional  right) owe  their existence  to what some  identifiable  piece  of constitutional  law
says-SLM,  remember,  is a method  for deciding  what a given  constitutional  law  or other law
does or does not say.  Second, the judge might have taken the view that a constitutional law does
say the claimed  right exists, while  we  take  the view  that use  of SLM does not yield that conclu-
sion.
32 491  U.S. 397  (1989).
33  431  U.S. 494 (1977).
34  See U.S.  CONST. amend.  XIV,  §  1.  Yes,  I  know,  debate  still continues  about whether the
words  of  this  clause  set  up  any  substantive  guarantees  at  all,  see,  e.g.,  JOHN  HART  ELY,
DEMOCRACY  AND  DISTRUST:  A THEORY  OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  15  (1980);  however,  that debate  is
beside the point of my inquiry here,  see supra  Part I.B.JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
freedom  to burn a flag you own  as an act of political  protest is "enu-
merated"  by way of "the freedom  of speech.  How can  these judg-
ments  be rendered  mutually consistent?  In  what way  does  the First
Amendment's  speech  clause  "mark as special"  a  "value"  encompass-
ing flag-burning,  in which  the Fifth Amendment's liberty clause does
not  thus  "mark"  a  "value"  encompassing  free  choice  in  household
formation?  Whatever  the  answer,  we  see  that  "enumerated" status
cannot  be just  a  matter  of  the  dictionary  meanings  of the  words
found  in constitutional  laws;  surely one  strains  the dictionary  mean-
ing  of  "liberty"  no  more  (not  to  say  less!)  by  applying  it  to  Inez
Moore's  assembly  of her  household  than  one  strains  the  dictionary
meaning  of "speech" by  applying  it to  Gregory  Lee Johnson's  pyro-
technics.
If the  dictionary  is not the  answer  to our  question  about how to
render mutually consistent the  thoughts that Moore is an instance of a
judicial finding of an unenumerated  constitutional right but Texas is
not, what else might be?  The answer is inevitable:  SLM.
Calling the  Texas right "enumerated" shows that SLM can be sup-
ple.  Evidently,  SLM  leaves  room for arguing by  chains of inference
from the scriptural words and sentences  (again, singularly or in struc-
tural and relational combination)  to conclusions about what has been
said,  including  in  those  chains  propositions  about  the  settings  and
motivations  of the  scriptural  utterance.  Concretely,  SLM  accommo-
dates  the possibility of finding that a constitutional  law says there is a
right  to burn flags  although no constitutional  law states in haec verba
that  people  have  rights  to  burn  flags,  nor  does  "speak"  ("speech")
normally  suggest striking  a match  and setting  some  piece  of matter
aflame.  (Compare  "Eloquence  may set fire  to  reason.
3 6)  What call-
ing the Moore right "unenumerated" shows  is that SLM  is supple  only
up  to  a  point.  Remembering  that SLM  is  an  approved  method for
finding out what a constitutional  law says,  the two  instances  together
show that an appearance  of warranted  reliance  on  SLM  to defend  a
finding  of a  claimed  constitutional  right's  existence  is  what  makes
that constitutional right register as "enumerated."
I feel your pain.  Under the name of SLM,  you say,  I am  positing
some  distinctly  identifiable  method  for  figuring  out  what  constitu-
tional  laws  say  regarding  the  existence-or-not  of claimed  constitu-
tional  rights.  I  am  positing, moreover,  a method that  does connect
35  See  U.S.  CONST.  amend.  I.  I  am generously  overlooking  the  point that-for formalists,
anyway-the  technically  operative  key  word  "liberty" is  the same in  Texas as  in  Griswold v.  Con-
necticut, 381  U.S.  479  (1965)  (in  the second  sentence  of Section  1 of the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment).  See Gitlow v. New York,  268 U.S. 652, 666  (1925)  (assuming that freedom of speech and
press are among  the "liberties" protected  by the Due  Process Clause  of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673  (Holmes,J., dissenting).
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the  "freedom of speech" locution  in  the  First Amendment  to a  flag-
burning right but  does not connect  the "liberty" locution  in the Four-
teenth  Amendment  to  a  freedom-to-form-your-own-household  right.
"What is  this  SLM?"  you  protest.  "I  can't  recognize  it.  Describe it,
please."  That I cannot do.  SLM is not anything that I can describe or
you can recognize because it is not anything that is empirically identi-
fiable.  It is an abstraction, a place-holder, a parody of what some phi-
losophers might call an  idea of reason.  SLM is the notion we cannot do
without  when  called on  to  explain pairs of "enumerated  "/"unenumerated"
judgments such as those in Texas  and Moore,  within the terms of a minimal
legal  formalism that conceives of every  legal judgment as being controlled by
what antecedently existent laws are found to say.
If such an empty idea of SLM makes you queasy, we could try put-
ting the  matter this way:  SLM,  a method for figuring  out what a for-
mally recognized  constitutional  law  says,  is a highly  contested notion
(consider  the  debate  among  originalists,
3 7  textualists,
38  pragmatists, 9
coherentists,0  eclectics,4'  and  moral  readers,2  etc.),  and  any  dis-
agreements  about whether  a claimed  constitutional  right  is enumer-
ated or unenumerated  will  directly reflect disagreements  about what
is and is not encompassed by SLM.  If you still feel suspicious of this
whole  edifice of thought, then I suggest  the  reason is that you reject
the  minimal-formalist  premise  on  which  it  is  reared.  You  do  not
agree that what some identified, laid-down  batch of constitutional  law
says  is  ever the  key  to  a conclusion  respecting  the  existence  or  non-
existence  of a claimed constitutional  right.  The true warrant  for all
such conclusions  lies always and entirely elsewhere, you believe.  You
are in reputable company if that is your view.  Perhaps, for example,
you agree with  Ronald Dworkin  that legal judgments are true just in
case  they "follow from  the  principles  of justice,  fairness,  and  proce-
dural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation  of
37  See,  e.g.,  RAOUL  BERGER,  GOVERNMENT  BY  JUDICIARY:  THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE
FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT  (1970).
38 See,  e.g., John  F. Manning,  The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts,  113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004).
39  See, e.g.,  RICHARD A. POSNER,  LAW,  PRAGMATISM,  AND DEMOCRACY  (2003).
40  See,  e.g.,  Richard  H.  Fallon, Jr.,  A  Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
41  See,  e.g.,  PHILIP  C.  BOBBIrT,  CONSTITUTIONAL  FATE:  THEORY  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION
(1982).
42  See,  e.g.,  RONALD  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW:  THE  MORAL  READING  OF  THE  AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION  (1996).
43 That proposition  holds despite the point made  in  note 31  that a claim for recognition  of
an admittedly unenumerated right may appeal to some form  of warrant quite aside  from what
identified  pieces  of constitutional  law can  be  found  to  say.  If you accept  my  suggestion  that
"enumerated" means existence-warrantable-by-use-of-SLM,  then whenever there is disagreement
over whether some claimed constitutional right  is  or is not enumerated, there necessarily  is dis-
agreement over the content or application of SLM.JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the  community's  legal  practice.""  But then  you also  are  part  of a
company whose  message  is  that  no true  constitutional  right  is  enu-
merated  (or none  is any more enumerated than any other)-and for
whom,  therefore,  talk  about  unenumerated  constitutional  rights  is
both inane and misleading.
If  that  is  where  you  stand,  then  it  is  not  your  framework  of
thought that I  am  trying  to explicate  here.  I  am  trying  to  capture
some  aspects of the routine  thought of lawyers  who  do feel  it makes
sense  to  speak  of constitutional  rights,  actual  or  claimed,  that  are
enumerated-by contrast, that is,  to unenumerated.  And what I  insist
on  is  this:  Lawyers  who routinely think of constitutional  rights as ei-
ther/or-enumerated  or unenumerated-have  lodged in some  part
of their brains  the thought  that propositions  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  in  my
series of five are true:  that one way, if not the only way, to warrant the
existence  of a  claimed  constitutional  right  is  by  finding  a  constitu-
tional law  (use of the individuating  article  is significant)  that says  the
right exists, and that there is an identifiable SLM for finding out what
constitutional  laws  say  regarding  the  existence  or non-existence  of
claimed  constitutional  rights.  Those  lawyers  are  also  thinking  that
(4)  is true-sometimes  courts or other authorities find constitutional
rights to  exist, when they admit, or we  believe,  that SLM was not or
could not have  been used to establish  the formal  link-the need  for
which  is  posited by  (1)  and  (2)-between that right's existence  and
what is said by some recognized constitutional law.
From  there  it  would  follow  that  the  embedded  proposition  in
(5)-findings of existent  constitutional  rights  may  merit  respect  as
lawful  even  though SLM  cannot  establish  their existence-is  at least
arguable  in our constitutional  culture.  Were  that not so,  talk about
unenumerated  constitutional  rights  could  not much  engage  our at-
tentions.  In sum, then,  my claim  is that  all such  talk routinely  buys
into the whole batch of propositions,  (1) through  (5).  Indeed  I think
that much is close to self-evident, when one thinks about it, and I take
it as true in what follows.
44 RONALD  DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE  225  (1986);  see  id. at  227-399  (spelling out Dworkin's
view that  the community's  legal  practice  includes  the  community's  whole  prior  legal  history,
including  constitutional  and statutory enactments, judicial decisions  applying  them,  common
law decisions,  secondary  explanatory  materials such as judicial opinions  and legislative  history,
and the community's  evolving and successive paradigms for assembling and ordering  such  ma-
terials).
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IV.  A DEMOCRACY-BASED  OBJECTION TO UNENUMERATED
CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS, IN A POPULAR-
CONSTITUTIONALIST  WORLD?
A.  Current-Majoritarian  Democracy (tla  Bickel)
The  Standard Worry's concern with  unenumerated  constitutional
rights is-we said-precisely  a worry about judicial  findings  of consti-
tutional rights that do not or cannot claim the backing of an applica-
tion of a commonly  accepted SLM  to the words and sentences found
in recognized  constitutional laws.  That worry evaporates, we said, in a
world of popular constitutionalism.  Perhaps, however, other worries
remain or come into view in such a world.
Let us now ask:  Is there any conceivable  reason,  rooted in a concern
for democracy, why anyone  in  such a world  should  worry about admit-
ting  into  general  political  discourse  and debate  a notion of unenu-
merated  constitutional  rights?  We  can  start  by  asking  whether,  in
such  a world, ideas of constitutional  rights  in any form might be ob-
jectionable  from  a  democracy-protective  standpoint.4 5   The  answer
may be yes, depending on what you mean by democracy, and to show
why,  I  repeat  an  example  I  have  used  before  of a  conceivable-if
unlikely-enumerated constitutional right.
46
Imagine that some country amends its constitution by adding what
we  may  call  the  Libertarian  Amendment.  The  Amendment  reads:
"The regulatory state  is  hereby abolished.  Parliament shall make no
law attaching liabilities,  penalties or burdens  of any kind to  conduct
that would not be  actionable  at common  law. 4 7  The  constitution  as
amended  now contains  a very  strong, enumerated  right of freedom
from  statutory regulation.  Imagine  also that in  this country  there is
no practice  of judicial constitutional  review.  Courts are expected  to
give  full  effect  to  all  statutory  enactments  no  matter  how  glaringly
unconstitutional  anyone may think them.  The constitution's substan-
tive  requirements  and prohibitions  are  left  to  be  made  effective  on
45  The title  of  Jeremy Waldron's  A  Right-Based Critique of Constitutional  Rights, 13  OXFORDJ.
LEG.  STUD.  18  (1993),  suggests that Waldron's answer would be yes.  However, Waldron's article
does not really tackle the question  of whether  his critique of constitutional rights persists under
abolition ofjudicial  review.  I, here, offer a suggestion about how it might.
46  See Michelman, supra note  16, at 29.
47  The thought  is not entirely  fanciful.  See Lucas  v.  S.C.  Coastal  Comm'n,  505  U.S.  1003,
1029-30  (1992)  (making actionability  under prior  "background  law,"  of the uses  of property
prohibited  by a new regulatory enactment,  the test of the state's duty to pay compensation  for a
"taking" of property); Richard  A. Epstein,  Takings, Exclusivity and Speech:  The  Legacy of Prune-
Yard v. Robins,  64 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  21,  22-28  (1997)  (proposing  to make common-law  nuisance
doctrine the baseline for measuring when  regulatory enactments amount to takings of property
for which the Constitution  requires compensation).JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
those to whom they are addressed through self-discipline bolstered by
constituency pressures.
Of course  it  does  not follow  that  the  constitution's  substantive
parts  have  no constraining  effect  on  legislative  decision-making.  In
the absence of judicial enforcement, there  are two possibilities.  One
is  that the  country's  legislative  officials  will  allow  themselves  to  be
constrained  by  plain  laws  of the  constitution;  the  other  is  they  will
not.  If they will not, then what would be the point of writing the su-
per-libertarian  right into the constitution?  What would be the  point
of naming something  a constitutional  right  that we  do not mean  or
expect to  be  taken seriously  by public officials  presumed compliant?
But if we do then suppose that officials, unsupervised  by courts, really
will act differently under constraint  of a sweeping  constitutional rule
against statutory regulation than they would in its  absence, is democ-
racy not accordingly undone by the Libertarian Amendment?
Perhaps the answer is yes if we follow Alexander Bickel's view  that
democracy's  "essence"  is  the power of a current representative  major-
ity  to  shape  enacted  public  policy to  its liking,  setting  aside  earlier
enactments as it will.4 8  Everyone-supporters  and detractors-will see
the Libertarian Amendment as profoundly counter-democratic  in  that
sense.  Shackling  current  and future  representative  majorities  is  ex-
actly the point and aim of the Amendment.
On the other side, one may argue  that constitutional  shackles are
not always  counter-democratic,  even  in  Bickel's current-majoritarian
sense of democracy.  They are counter-democratic  when they take  the
form  of  interventions  by  politically  unaccountable  bodies  such  as
courts,  in  the name of past constitutional  majorities dead and gone,
restraining  current  representative  legislative  assemblies  from  giving
current popular majorities the laws  those majorities want.  But that is
not a correct description  of what goes  on  in popular constitutional-
ism.  In  popular constitutionalism,  the  "shackles" of which  we  speak
are  political  pressures  coming from  a  current popular  majority de-
manding  the  legislature's  compliance  with  a norm  of the  constitu-
tion.  For some fraction  of that current majority, the  motivation for
the  compliance  demand  may be  a particular liking for the  norm in
question.  For another, no doubt overlapping fraction, the motivation
may  lie  elsewhere-in  some  value  (maybe  they call  it "rule  of law")
that its members see  in compliance  by officials  with all  duly enacted
constitutional  norms, like  them  or not.  Even  assuming  the  latter is
the sole motivation, it is far from immediately clear that what is going
48  See ALEXANDER BICKEL,  THE LEAST DANGEROUS  BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS  17  (1962)  ("[A]lthough  democracy does not mean  constant reconsideration  of de-
cisions  once  made, it does mean  that  a representative  majority has  the  power to accomplish  a
reversal.  This power is of the essence .... ").
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on  here  deserves  to  be  called  a  deviation  from  democracy,  even  in
Bickel's current-majoritarian  sense of the term.
But  suppose  we  decide  to  call  it a  deviation, and  accordingly  we
raise  objection  on democracy's  behalf. The  point  to  see  is  that this
objection  does not attach  in any special way to  unenumerated rights-
meaning, here, rights that  effectively are constitutionalized  by forms
of popular deliberation and debate  that do not confine themselves  to
the  application  of any recognized  SLM  to  formalized  constitutional
texts.  An aggregation  of unenumerated  rights-assuming them to be
such for the sake  of the argument-to  marital  privacy, : ) marital free-
dom °  access  to  birth  control, 5  abortion,  traditional  freedom  of
choice  in  family  and  household  formation'  and  choice  of sexual
partner 5 4 can  hardly be  thought more  constrictive  of general  legisla-
tive competence than  the tentacular webs of constraints apparently or
allegedly drawn by SLM from "the  freedom of speech"  and "respect-
ing an establishment of religion. 55  As my example  of the Libertarian
Amendment  is meant to  show, constriction  flows from  what the  rec-
ognized right is  a right to, or how sweepingly  it is  thought  to apply,
and not from the ratiocinative  processes from which  recognition and
definition arise.
B.  Democracy on Two Tracks (&i la Ackerman)
In  Bruce  Ackerman's  two-track,  or  "dualist,"  conception  of  de-
mocracy,  the  essence  of democracy  lies  not in  the  power  of current
representative  majorities to conform  the laws to their wishes.  To  the
contrary,  it lies  in  the  power of the  people,  politically  aroused  and
excited  at  special  moments  of "higher" lawmaking,  to  constrain  by
their enactments at such moments what is done at other times by leg-
islative  agents who  have  no claim  to  act in  the  people's  name."  In
such a view, constitutional rights  (true ones, of course, not false ones)
are  not counter-democratic,  they are rather superlatively  democratic.
That proposition holds when  the policing agent  is an electorally  un-
accountable  court, and  it apparently  would  hold  a fortiori when  the
policing agent  is,  as  the lingo goes,  the people themselves.'  The  re-
49 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381  U.S.  479 (1965).
50 SeeZablocki v. Redhail,  434 U.S. 374  (1978);  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401  U.S. 371  (1971).
51 SeeEisenstadtv.  Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
52 SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113  (1973).
3 See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431  U.S. 494  (1977).
54 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558  (2003).
.55  See,  e.g.,  Paul  D.  Carrington,  Our Imperial  First  Amendment, 34 U.  RICH. L.  REN,.  1167,  1168-
70  (2001)  (questioning the expansive  reach afforded  the First Amendment).
56  See BRUCE  ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS  6-7 (1991).
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sult:  Dualist  theory  can  entertain  no worry  on  democracy's  behalf
about constitutional rights in a world of popular constitutionalism.
However  conclusive  that  chain  of inference  may  be,  it  leaves  us
short of an answer to the specific question we have on the table.  That
question  is  whether  two-track  theorists  might  have  some  reason  to
hang on to our accustomed differentiation between  enumerated and
unenumerated  rights  in  a  world  of popular  constitutionalism.  We
have  seen  that  the  answer  is  "no"  for  "monistic  democrats"' '8  like
Bickel, who  equate democracy  with  the power of current representa-
tive majorities  to have their way with the laws.  Two-track theorists, we
are about to see, must answer differently.
Are  Larry  Kramer's  "people  themselves"  equatable  to Bruce  Ac-
kerman's "We the People?"  Most certainly they are  not.  Ackerman's
People  are  the  populace  conducting  an  exceptional  form  of  high
politics, laying down norms of constitutional law  (albeit sometimes by
proceedings  not  scripted  by  Article  V)  at  punctuated  moments.
Kramer's people, by contrast, are the populace at any time simply giv-
ing their opinions about what the norms laid down mean in practice.
Two-track theory has no use for the constitutional opinions of judges
when  not closely tied to  legal-not-merely-political  exegesis of texts  or
quasi-texts  laid  down  in  the  special  political  excitement  of  self-
conscious  higher lawmaking. 59  No more  can  it have  use for the con-
stitutional  opinions of Kramer's  people when  those are  not likewise
products  of genuine  applications  of SLM-our term,  remember, for
legal,  not merely political,  exegesis  of constitutional  laws  laid  down.
But a constitutional  right whose  existence is found by an application
of SLM  is  precisely,  on  our  analysis,  an  enumerated  constitutional
right.  Two-track  democracy  theory,  we  may  conclude,  must  reject
unenumerated  constitutional  rights,  in  or  out  of  a  popular-
constitutionalist world.
But  Bruce  Ackerman,  you  rise  to  protest,  defends  the  Supreme
Court's  privacy decisions-the  signature  products of the  unenumer-
ated rights industry.  And  indeed he does defend  them, but most de-
cidedly not as findings  of unenumerated  rights.  To the contrary, Ac-
kerman  claims  that  the  privacy  results  can  be  obtained  by  an
application to norms of constitutional law, laid down at constitutional
moments, of something he  calls "synthetic" constitutional  interpreta-
tion; which,  he claims,  is the form of SLM  (a not-mere-politics  mode,
remember,  of connecting  formally  cognizable  constitutional  laws  to
5s  ACKERMAN,  supra note 56, at 7.
59  For  two-track  theory's vehement  rejection  of trans-formalist judicial  findings  of constitu-
tional rights,  see, for example,  Bruce Ackerman,  The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering  the Constitution,
93 YALE  L.J.  1013,  1070  (1984),  which  speaks ofjudicial  treatments  of constitutional  text and
precedent that are so "fast and loose" as to amount to "legal nihilism."
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findings  of constitutional  rights)  compatible  with  two-track  theory.
6 0
Ackerman's  proposal  for synthetic  interpretation  just goes  to  show
how elusive, how slippery, is our ineluctable notion of SLM.
V.  A CONTRACT-BASED  OBJECTION TO UNENUMERATED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, IN A POPULAR-
CONSTITUTIONALIST  WORLD?
A.  Summary of the Argument
I  take popular constitutionalism to be a fully robust variant of con-
stitutionalism.  No  less  than  other  variants,  popular  constitutional-
ism-on  my  understanding-still  contemplates  the  salience  in  the
country's  affairs of a  legal  constitution,  expected  to serve  the  social-
ordering functions and satisfy the social-ordering needs that constitu-
tions, on one or another account, are expected to serve and to satisfy.
Among such accounts  one finds a group  that I  label "constitutional-
contractarian."  These  are accounts  in which  the  constitution  is  piv-
otal for answering  a question  of legitimacy--meaning  moral justifica-
tion of the coercive  operations of civil government.  The constitution
figures  in such accounts  as  a contract analog, a  social  quasi-contract
in  which  the  place  of consent  is  filled by  qualified  expectations  of
consent.  (When  I  write  in what  follows  of the  constitutional  "con-
tract,"  please  understand  me  as  meaning  the  contract  analog  or
quasi-contract to which  I have just referred.)
Part V.B.  sets  out a  specific  example  of such  a contractarian  ac-
count of what a constitution  is for, drawn  from the  political philoso-
phy of John Rawls.  Part V.C. establishes that this account can tolerate
the absence ofjudicial review, at least in principle.  Part V.D.  takes up
the question of whether it can also tolerate  in principle the notion of
unenumerated  constitutional rights, and Part V.E. gives the answer.
That answer will  be "not exactly."  It will  not issue,  though, from
any  claim that the Rawlsian  contractarian  view  allows only enumerated
constitutional rights.  Somewhat to the contrary, I shall maintain that
this view cannot recognize the distinction on which such a claim must
depend.  I  mentioned  above  the  possibility  of rejecting  totally "the
minimal-formalist  premise  ...  that  what  some  identified,  laid-down
piece  of constitutional  law says  is  ever the key to a conclusion  respect-
ing the existence  or non-existence  of a claimed constitutional  right."
That is what I think the Rawlsian  constitutional-contractarian  account
of the constitution's  place  in political  affairs  is  committed  to  doing.
Unenumerated-rights  talk  is,  on  this  view,  objectionable  because  it
60  SeeACKERMAN,  supra note 56, at 140-42,  150-58.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
misleads  by suggesting that some constitutional  rights  (the ones that
ring  the  truest)  are  enumerated,  and  some  (the  second-raters)  are
not.  In a word, I  believe  Rawlsian constitutional contractarians  must
eject "unenumerated rights" from the discourse,  on grounds of pleo-
nasm.
Here,  in brief, is  the  reason  why.  In  the  Rawlsian,  legitimating
constitutional  contract,  a  core  term  is  a  guarantee  that  politics  re-
garding matters of concern to basic justice will be conducted under a
constraint of public  reason.  That  is,  no one  is  to  deploy his or her
modicum of influence  over any law-fixing choice, when that choice is
destined  to  exert  coercive  pressure  on persons  within  range  of the
law, in favor of a choice that he or she does not stand ready to defend
with reasons that he or she sincerely believes  should count as reasons
for anyone  else in range who is reasonable and rational. 6'  As we shall
see,  this  constraint  of public  reason  is  not just  a  matter  of form-
respect for laws  of logic, for the  established findings  of science,  and
the like; it is also  a matter of value.  Ultimately,  it always  comes back
to the value  of mutual  respect and regard among persons  conceived
as  reasonable  and  rational,  equal  and  free,  endowed  with  interests
both in plotting a life for oneself guided by one's own understanding
of what gives  value  to  a  life,  and  in  recognizing and abiding by fair
terms of cooperation  with others likewise endowed.
The final upshot of this line of thought, I  shall suggest, is that all
rights in a Rawlsian,  legitimating constitution  are, in the last analysis,
unenumerated.  The  public  values  by which  public  reason  is  con-
strained  correspond  to  the  "rational  continuum"  invoked  in what  I
take to be  the  classic  expression  of a  constitutional jurisprudence  of
unenumerated rights:  the dissent of Justice John M. Harlan  (the sec-
ond)  in Poe v. Ullman.  What we speak of as "enumerated rights" .are
nothing but  especially,'  temporally  obvious  instantiations  of that  ra-
tional continuum.
B.  Basics of a Rawlsian Constitutional-Contractarian  Account of Political
Justification  and Legitimacy6
Constitutional-contractarian  thought  places an  idealized constitu-
tion  at the  crux  of an  answer  to  a  problem  of political  legitimacy.
The problem is that of how to justify coercion by lawmaking in a soci-
61 To be  precise,  Rawls would  have  the constraint apply  only where  matters  of basic justice
stand  to  be  affected,  seeJOHN RAWLS,  POLITICAL  LIBERALISM  137  (1996),  but this  qualification
has no bearing on our argument.
62  367 U.S. 497, 543  (1961)  (Harlan,J.,  dissenting).
63 The following  discussion  is drawn from  Frank  I.  Michelman,  The Problem of Constitutional
Interpretive  Disagreement: Can "Discourses  ofApplication" Help?, in  HABERMAS AND  PRAGMATISM  113,
115-20  (Mitchell Aboulafia et al. eds., 2002).
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ety of "free  and equal" persons. 6 4  Speaking  specifically of a  democ-
racy, justification responds  to  the question  of how "citizens  [may]  by
their vote  properly exercise  ...  coercive political  power  over one an-
other."  From the reciprocal  standpoint of those  ("us")  to whom  the
laws are directed, the question  is that of how other people's exercises
of their shares of political power may be rendered justifiable to us.
John Rawls  supplies an answer  to  these questions that he calls the
liberal  principle  of  legitimacy:  "Our ...  political  power
is... justifiable  [to others  as free and equal]  ...  when  it is exercised
in accordance  with  a constitution the  essentials  of which  all  citizens
may be expected  to  endorse  in the  light of principles  and  ideals  ac-
ceptable  to  them  as  reasonable  and  rational."6- In  this claim  about
political justification,  we can distinguish  three key components of the
sort  of  approach  to  this  question  that  I  call  constitutional-
contractarian.  They are as follows:
1.  Individualism
At  the  core  of the  constitutional-contractarian  approach  to  the
justification  of political  coercion  stands a  liberal's  insistence  on  the
normative  primacy-that  is,  as  objects of moral  concern-of notion-
ally  free  and  equal  individuals;  hence,  the  demand  that  potentially
coercive political acts be acceptable  from the standpoints of each (not
"all," in some collectivized  sense of "all")  of countless persons among
whom  conflicts  of interest  and  vision  abound.  Constitutional  con-
tractarianism begins with  the idea that exercises of political power are
most surely justified when  every  affected,  competently  reasoning  in-
dividual can approve them as in line with his or her own  actual order
of reasons.
2.  Civility
Of course  one  doesn't look for actual  approval  by everyone;  that
game is not on.
66  The test for the justification of laws will  have  to be
one  of hypothetical,  not actual  agreement:  universal  acceptability,
not  universal  acceptance.  We  look  to  reasons  for  general  law-
abidingness  that everyone  is considered to have by whoever  applies the
test.  What is more:  If the contractarianjustificatory project is to have
any  real  prospect  of success  (or  so  some  theorists  maintain)  then
"one's  own"  order  of reasons  cannot  be  conceived  as  blind  to  the
64  RAWLS,  supra note 61,  at 217.
65  Id.
For  a  recent,  cogent  review  of why  not,  see  RANDY  E.  BARNETT,  RESTORING  THE  LOST
CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY  (2004).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
presence  of others whom  one regards  as  sources  of moral claims  to
respect and regard just like one's own.  Those  moral claims will have
to  be  conceived  as  entering  into  "one's  own"  order  of reasons-as
67 reasons for me as well as for them-and vice-versa.
Constitutional-contractarian  thought  thus  builds  special  motiva-
tional suppositions  into its  acceptability  test.  In Rawls's  formulation,
coercion  by law  is justified when  its exercise  accords with a  constitu-
tional  regime  that  all  may  be  expected  to  endorse  in  the  light  of
principles  and  ideals  acceptable  to them  not  only  "as  rational"  but
also  "as  reasonable."  "Reasonable,"  there,  means  imbued  with  the
spirit  of reciprocity  or  civility,  of recognition  of others  as  free  and
equal-free  as you  are  or  aim  to  be, your  equals  in having  lives  of
their  own  to live  and ideas  of their own  about how  to  live  them.  A
reasonable  person  stands ready  to accept  the laws as  long as  (a)  she
sees  everyone  else  generally  supporting  and  complying  with  them,
and  (b) she sees how these  laws conform to a set of ideals and princi-
ples that merit mutual acceptance  by a competently reasoning group
of persons,  all of whom desire, and  suppose each  other all to desire,
to find and abide  by fair terms of social cooperation in conditions of
deep  and  enduring  but reasonable  disagreement  over  questions  of
the good. 6 8
3.  Constitutional  proceduralism
In modern  societies,  it seems  beyond imagination  that  every dis-
crete  act of lawmaking  could plausibly be portrayed  as passing a uni-
versal-acceptance  test, even where  it is only a loosened  test of hypo-
thetical acceptability to the counterfactually reasonable.  It seems that
even such  a loosened  contractarian standard  of political justification
can only be meant for application  to  constitutional  laws-the subset of
laws that fundamentally shape,  organize, and limit the country's  law-
making system, or what lawyers would call its proper-sense  legal consti-
tution. 9  Constitutional-contractarian  political justification  rests  on
the idea that the acceptability  of a constitutional  system to every rea-
sonable person is tantamount to the acceptability,  to every reasonable
67  The point is controversial.  See, e.g.,  DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS  BY AGREEMENT  (1986).  We
can,  however, accept  it for the sake of expository convenience.  The argument  I am mounting
will  go  through  even if other persons  and their presence  in the social  space are  conceived  to
figure  in  "one's own" order of reasons only instrumentally,  as  forces  that somehow  have  to be
reckoned with for the sake of one's own self-centered projects.  The general, contractarianjusti-
ficatory strategy is as applicable and apt on one assumption  as on the other.
See RAWLS,  supra  note 61,  at xliv, xlvi,  226-27;John Rawls,  The Idea of Public  Reason Revisited,
in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 576-79, 581,  605-06  (Samuel Freeman  ed., 1999).
69  See Charles Larmore,  The Moral  Basis of Liberalism, 96J. PHIL. 599,  606 n.8 (1999)  (agreeing
with  Rawls  that the  test is  "meant to  govern  chiefly  the choice  of basic,  constitutional  princi-
ples").
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person, of demands for everyone's  compliance with  every law that is-
sues from the system, regardless of disagreements  about the merits of
those laws, including their consonance with justice. °  That is the con-
tract-like element in the conception, and on it depends the attraction
of the claim that exercises  of political  coercion  are justifiable  insofar
as  they accord with  "a  constitution, the essentials  of which  all  citizens
may  be  expected  to  endorse."  But  what  is  Rawls  doing  with  the
phrase, "the essentials of which?"
Consider the idea of a sufficient, legitimating constitutional  agreement.
Four terms would compose this idea, as follows:
First, what is supposed to be "legitimated" (in the sense ofjustified
morally)  by this  agreement  is  an extant  practice  of political  govern-
ment  or  rule-the  coercive  exercise  of collective  political  power,
through lawmaking, by and among citizens considered as individually
free and equal.
Second, what is supposed  to have  the desired legitimating effect is
agreement by each person affected.  Not, however, actual  agreement
but  counterfactual  agreement-the  "acceptability"  of  the  political
practice  among persons  affected by it, envisioning  those persons not
only as rational but also as reasonable.
Third,  the  legitimating  counterfactual  agreement  is  a  constitu-
tional-it is,  in  an  important  sense,  a  procedural-agreement.  We
don't  apply  the  universal-reasonable  acceptability  test  to  each  and
every specific  law that crops up in a country's politics-we rather feel
that would be  hopeless.  We  apply the  test, instead,  to  the country's
system  for lawmaking,  its constitution,  including  any  bill  of guaran-
teed rights the system may contain.  Lawmakers and others who wield
governmental  powers may plead  nolo contendere to complaints of injus-
tice  or other defects  of substance  in specific  laws  and other  official
acts,  while  still  pointing  to  the  constitution  to  sustain  the  morally
compelling  (not just  the  legally  valid)  character  of their  acts.  Of
course, it will have  to be  a constitution of the right sort:  one that all
citizens  may  be  expected  to endorse  in  the  light  of principles  and
ideals  acceptable  to  them  as  reasonable  and  rational,  or whatever.
With-but  only  with-such  a  constitution  in  place,  "it's  constitu-
tional" suffices to establish the  moral probity of demands for compli-
ance with official acts by all  to whom the system extends.  The consti-
70  Of course  this has implications for the approach  that those who interpret  the Constitution
authoritatively are to take to their work.  See Samuel  Freeman,  Original  Meaning,  Democratic Inter-
pretation, and the Constitution, 21  PHIL.  & PUB.  AFF.  3,  25-28  (1992)  (maintaining  that constitu-
tional interpreters  "are  to construe  the  Constitution  so  that its  essential  requirements  could
be...  accepted  by everyone" from  the "common point of view" of "sovereign  citizens moved by
the same  basic  interests  in  preserving  our  freedom  and  equal  status"),  cited  with approval in
RAWLS,  supra note 61,  at 234 n.19;  see infra text accompanying  notes 88-93.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tution  in that way  serves  in the  place of a  long-term,  relational  con-
tract-although, obviously, it is not remotely a contract.
And so we come to the fourth term, "sufficient."  In order to meet
the  counterfactual  test  of rational  acceptability  to  every  reasonable
person, a lawmaking system has to include a principle or guarantee-
in some  instances  tantamount  to a  "right"-affecting  every  topic  of
possible  governmental  decision-making  for which  a rational  person,
responding reasonably, would demand a guarantee  as a condition  of
willing support  for  the  system  as  a whole.  It  may  be  controversial
whether  "every  topic" necessarily  includes  at least  one  topic  beyond
the barest guarantee  of universal adult suffrage, one-person-one-vote,
decision  by  majority  rule,  freedom  from  arbitrary  detention,  and
maybe some modicum  of protection  against the grossest violations  of
freedom  of political  expression  and  association.'  For now, we  can
follow Rawls  in supposing that a constitutional  package  sufficient for
political justification  must  include  some guarantees  of undoubtedly
substantive  "basic  rights and  liberties"  such  as  liberty of conscience
and freedoms of thought and of movement.
7 2
"Enumerated" guarantees,  or "unenumerated," or does it matter?
Shall  it be  a list  (an "enumeration")  of minimally required,  guaran-
teed basic liberties,7 3 or a blanket  ("unenumerated")  guarantee along
the lines  of "an adequate  scheme  of ...  basic liberties?'' 4  A constitu-
tional-contractarian  set  of constitutional  essentials  includes  at  least
one  or the other  (or maybe  both)  of those, and it is interesting that
Rawls  seems  drawn  to formulations  of both  kinds.  Rawls  does  ex-
pressly say that the constitutional  essentials in his scheme comprise a
"list" of liberties,
75 but perhaps,  as we will see,  this must be  taken with
a grain  of salt.  Either  way,  the rights-protective  part of the  constitu-
tion must be extensive  enough to  compose,  along with  the  constitu-
tional  essentials  dealing  with  "the  structure  of government  and the
political process,"76 a system for political decision-making about which
every  affected, reasonable  person can rationally say:  A  system measur-
ing up to these principles and terms-all of them-is sufficiently regardful of
every reasonable and rational  person's interests and status as free and equal
7  SeeJeremy Waldron,  The Core of the Case AgainstJudicial  Review,  115  YALE LJ.  1346,  1360-62
(2006)  (suggesting  that such  conditions may suffice  for  the superior legitimacy  of democratic
over judicial  decision  in  settings  of deep  and  widespread  disagreement  over  the  content  of
rights).
72  See, e.g.,  RAWLS,  supra note 61,  at 227 (explaining that the constitutional essentials include
"basic rights and liberties that legislative  majorities are to respect").
73  See id. at 291  (listing "freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political  liberties
and freedom  of association, as  well as  the freedoms specified  by the liberty and integrity  of the
person; and..  . the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law").
74  Id. at 292.
75  See id. at 291-92.
76 Id. at 227.
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that I ought in all reason and civility (reciprocity) to support it and its legisla-
tive products,  provided everyone else does.
It is of the utmost importance  to our inquiry that the idea of con-
stitutional  essentials has  a negative or limiting as well  as a  positive or
demanding side.  In a constitutional-contractarian  perspective,  a con-
stituted system can be  over-full,  in  the sense that it can include some
principle of limitation or of mandate, the inclusion  of which has  the
effect of making the system  not reasonably acceptable  to everyone.  (As
an appropriately controversial  example,  consider whether to  include
in  a constitution for South Africa today a principle  flatly prohibiting
race-conscious  government action, for any reason, under any circum-
stances, ever.)  When it comes to drawing up the list of constitutional
essentials,  false  positives  are  no  less  fatal  than false  negatives  to  the
project of constitutional-contractarian  political justification.  A  con-
tractarian  essential constitution, while  it must not be  too sparse, must
not be overloaded, either.  Of course, that does not yet mean that no
supposed  constitutional  agreement  can  possibly  pass  contractarian
muster.  "Enough but not too much" is not, in the abstract, a logically
unsatisfiable sort of demand.
C.  Bracketing  Judicial  Review
We are trying here, remember, to sidestep the Standard Objection
to  unenumerated  constitutional  rights,  which  presupposes  judicial
review.  We want to know whether  the  idea of unenumerated consti-
tutional  rights  is in any way  problematic for conceptions  of constitu-
tionalism that dispense with judicial review, and therefore, necessarily
with  the  "legal question  doctrine"  as well.7  In order  to extend  that
inquiry  to  constitutional-contractarian  approaches  to  political justifi-
cation  in  a  democracy,  we  need  first to  verify  that such  approaches
can get along without judicial review.
John  Rawls  says  surely yes,  although  he  is  sympathetic  to judicial
review  and prepared  to  defend  it against charges  of incompatibility
with  democracy.  Now plainly  there is no conceptual reason why con-
stitutional-contractarian  political justification  could not be cogent  in
a world  of popular  constitutionalism,  sans judicial  review.  The  key
question  has to be whether  the  substantive guarantees  required  in a
Rawlsian  constitution  are credible enough  to carry the  load of legiti-
mation in the absence of an external, judicial check on politics.  That
77 See supra text accompanying notes  16-25.
78 See RAWLs,  supra note  61, at  227-30, 231-40;  Frank I. Michelman, Justice as Fairness,  Legiti-
macy,  and the Question of  Judicial  Review:  A  Comment, 72  FORDHAM  L. REV.  1407  (2004)  (collect-
ing and examining Rawls's comments on judicial  review).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
question  is empirical, not conceptual, as Rawls appreciates."  If popu-
lar constitutionalists  see fit to maintain that the credibility of constitu-
tional  guarantees  essential to  legitimacy can  hold up  (in  one  or an-
other  country)  in  the  absence  of judicial  review-as,  for  example,
Mark Tushnet does for the United  States, on the stipulation that the
requisite guarantees are conceived  as "thin", 80-their  claim will not be
vulnerable to any logical objection that I can see.
The way now lies open to asking-clear of entanglement with  the
Standard  Objection-whether  the  constitutional-contractarian  ap-
proach  to political justification  in a democracy has any reason to con-
cern itself with the issue of enumerated versus unenumerated packag-
ing  for  constitutional  rights.  My  answer  will  be  that  it  does  have
reason  for concern,  but that  it cannot  choose  between  the  two  op-
tions thus presented.
D.  Principles  and Applications
No doubt there are some principles and rules for the constraint of
state  power  that  everyone  who  is  reasonable  must endorse,  and no
doubt some of those are quite easy to apply to large numbers of imag-
inable cases:  for example, the rule that no one may be held in jail for
an  alleged  offense  without  a  full and  speedy  trial.  Yet  it  seems  to
81 many  that cases arise with some frequency in pluralist constitutional
democracies-common  and important cases-for which no resolving
rule can  be found that is not reasonably rejectable by someone who is
reasonable,  as defined.
Here is an  example:  A constitutional  system  is not rationally  ac-
ceptable  to  everyone  who  is  reasonable-the  "agreement" is  not a
"sufficient" one-if, let us  say, it lacks  a guarantee  of full and equal
freedom of conscience.  The  principle of full and equal freedom  of
conscience  thus  becomes  a  constitutional  essential.  Unfortunately,
while no one rejects the principle, members of society do have severe
disagreements  about  its  correct  application  to  some  common  and
undoubtedly major classes of situations.  Take, for example, demands
for taxpayer support of private religious schools-perhaps  even if not
of private schools generally, and perhaps even when there are decent,
state-funded  secular schools open to everyone.  Or take demands for
exemptions  for religiously motivated  acts from laws-such  as  health
laws  and zoning  laws-that  anyone  might  sometimes  find  burden-
79  See Michelman, supra note  78, at 1411.
80 See TUSHNET, supra note 23, at 13  (remarking  that the Constitution's "thinness is essential"
to his  case  against judicial review);  id. at  11  (defining  the  "thin" Constitution  as consisting  of
"fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty").
81 See, e.g.,JEREMYWALDRON,  LAWAND  DISAGREEMENT  (1999).
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some, from which  occasional exceptions can be allowed with  no great
harm  resulting, but that  most people,  most of the  time  (or so  it  is
widely  believed),  simply  must be  required  to  obey,  for  the  general
good of society.
Some  feel  that  equal  liberty of conscience  requires,  in such  set-
tings,  concessions  to  religious  needs.  Others  feel just  as  sure  that
such special  concessions to  religion directly violate either equal free-
dom  of conscience  or  some  other, adjacent  constitutional  essential
such  as  equal citizenship.  It  does  not seem  that  either  side  is  pre-
pared  to write  off the  other  as insincere  or  obtuse.  Yet  their judg-
ments on this matter are incompatible.  Both cannot prevail.
Imagine, now, that one or the other of these contradictory views is
expressly laid down  by a country's constitution.  Suppose  it is the no-
aid, no-accommodation  view.  Is the constituted system now rationally
and reasonably  acceptable  to everyone,  in light of interests and con-
cerns  they  may  have  as  free  and equal  persons?  Alternatively,  sup-
pose  it is  the  mandatory,  pro-accommodation  view  that  gets specifi-
cally  constitutionalized.  Would we  then still  be sure  the  constituted
system was rationally acceptable  to every reasonable  person?  Have we
run  into a  reason to think that  a specific enumeration  of rights in  a
constitution  may  be  inimical  to  legitimacy?  Or  is  the  implication
rather that unenumerated  rights  are what  constitutional  contractari-
ans have reason  to avoid and rule out?
What  we  are  looking  at  is  the  possibility  that  neither a  constitu-
tional  prescription  broadly  requiring aid and  accommodation  nor a
prescription  broadly  prohibiting  aid  and accommodation  can  be  a
contractarian constitutional essential.  To be sure, this does not mean
that some quite  incisive principle of equal liberty of conscience cannot
still be a contractarian constitutional essential.  You or I might still be
prepared  to  maintain  that  a  universally  reasonable  and  acceptable
constitution  has  to  bar  laws  that  expressly  or  intentionally  punish,
ban,  or  stigmatize  people  for  religious  confession  as  such,  or  that
wantonly target religiously motivated activities for prohibition.
Such  laws  may  fall  within  a  universally  agreed  "central  range  of
82 application,"  as John  Rawls  calls  it, of equal  liberty of conscience.
But the questions of state  support for religiously  inflected  education
and of special accommodation for religion apparently do not.  Those
questions  may  quite  conceivably  be  ones  that  a constitution  cannot
foreclose,  either way,  if it hopes  to  pass the  universal-reasonable  ac-
ceptability test.  So perhaps the lesson is that only those constitutional
guarantees are tolerable  that are securely tethered to their respective
central  ranges-first  by agreement  that  no constitutional  constraint
82  RAwLS,  supra note 61,  at 295-96.JOURNAL OF CONSTFIU]TIONAL LAW
on state action will be found to exist except by identifying  a constitu-
tional  law that says it exists;  second  by care in  the verbal framing  of
constitutional  laws; and third  by a firewall  of SLM  that lets us more-
or-less figure out in advance of enactment, by an application  of legal-
not-merely-political reason, what this or that constitutional  law will be
found to  say.  All of that amounts, of course,  to an  exact formula for
enumerated rights.83
But that is not going to work.  Try envisioning a constitutional sys-
tem  with  no substantive  constraints  or guarantees  beyond  the  truly
uncontested  cores of the liberal verities.  I mean  cores  so confined
that you cannot  ever,  in any  circumstances,  say  they are  invaded  ei-
ther by state funding of religious  schools or by refusal  of such fund-
ing;  by laws instituting  affirmative action or by laws prohibiting  it; by
laws  prohibiting abortion  or by  laws  protecting  abortion  against pri-
vate  and social  obstruction;  by  laws protecting  a landlord's  freedom
to refuse  to rent  to  unmarried  or  same-sex  couples, or a  downtown
club's  freedom  to refuse  membership to women,  or  by laws  denying
those freedoms.  We  are  accustomed  to  think of these  laws  as  true
grist for the constitutional-legal  mill, as raising issues of legal validity
(and hence, on a contractarian view, of political legitimacy 
4) that are
already,  in  principle,  decided  by the laid-down  law  of the  Constitu-
tion, waiting to be applied.  But the issues raised  by these laws  all lie
outside  the uncontested  central ranges of the basic liberties, and they
would be  left undecided  by the trim constitution we are now contem-
plating.  Under that constitution, no official or non-official contender
in civic  or legislative  debate  (much less  any court or judge if there  is
judicial  review)  could  demand  or even  advocate for one or another
resolution  by appeal  to  the constitution.  Decision  would  be  left to
ordinary  political  action  in which  no constitutional-rights  cards  are
playable  (no clubs, as we might say in a twist on Thomas Hobbes) .
The  question  is whether  a constitutional  system with  such  a  con-
stricted  set  of bill-of-rights  guarantees  could  possibly warrant  every
reasonable  and rational  person's  agreement  to abide  by its  political
outcomes.  To  answer,  we  would  have  to  figure  our whether  some
people have  rationally cognizable  interests of such import as to make
it not reasonable  to ask them to commit to a system that, for example,
leaves  all  issues  outside  the  universally  agreed  central  ranges  of the
basic liberties  to be  resolved  by future politics with  no constitutional
83  See supra  Part III.
See supra  text accompanying notes 64-71.
85 "In matter of Government, when nothing else  is turn'd  up, Clubs are Trumps."  Thomas
Hobbes, Of Punishments,  in A DIALOGUE BETWEEN  A PHILOSOPHER  & A  STUDENT OF THE COMMON
LAWS OF ENGLAND  140,  140  (J. Cropsey ed.,  1971).
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pressure  either way.  Can such a system  be sufficient as a legitimating
constitutional agreement?
E.  The Fall-Back to the Constraint  of Public  Reason
I do not see how, and neither, I believe,  did John Rawls.  What he
thought-or so  I have come  to understand as his thought-is that (a)
a gap  remains  between  what  the  incontestable  central  ranges  cover
and what a constitutional  "contract" fully sufficient for political justi-
fication  in a democracy would have  to guarantee, and  (b) what could
fill  the  gap  would  be  a further,  call  it procedural,  guarantee  of the
application  of something  called  "public reason"  to  decide  claims  of
constitutional right falling outside the incontestable  central ranges.  I
have  previously explained that line of thinking as follows:
It  may  be  true  that no  one  can  know, before  the questions  are  de-
cided  either  politically or judicially, whether  or how the set of constitu-
tional principles and guaranties  will  be applied to the matter of exempt-
ing  churches  from  zoning  restrictions,  or  to  that  of  state-funded
education vouchers redeemable  at private  religious schools.  But what we
can  perhaps know  beforehand  is something about the  spirit or terms in
which  such  matters  will  be  addressed,  and  that  knowledge-it  may  be
suggested-can  thicken  the constitutional system to the point of sufficing
for legitimation.  We  can  know,  perhaps  (the contractarian  account  of
legitimacy will fail if we cannot),  that the right questions will be sincerely
posed  and  competently  pursued.  And  of course  we  should  not  forget
about  those central  ranges  of application of the basic  liberties  on which
we  can  posit  universal,  reasonable-and-rational,  substantive  agreement.
We package together the two types of guarantee-the  central ranges  and
public reason-and the hope, then,  is that the result is a constitution  that
a  rational  and  reasonable  person  can  treat  as  a  sufficient,  legitimating
constitutional agreement-or,  in other words, can  say about it something
like  this:  A system for further lawmaking  that I  can  see  conforming,  in
practice,  to the substance  and  also  the spirit of this  (sparse  as  the  sub-
stance is),  is  a system  that I  can  and in  all reason  ought to  sign up with.
The constraint  of public reason-the guarantee  that the right questions,
at least,  will be  posed and sincerely debated-itself thus becomes one of
the constitutional essentials. 86
Well,  what spirit?  What right questions?  We will get to that, but let
us  first  nail  down  how the  two  types  of guarantee-the  substantive
central-ranges  guarantee  and  the  procedural  public-reason  guaran-
tee-are supposed to work in tandem to fill out a sufficient, legitimat-
ing constitutional  agreement.  The  answer  lies  in the  relative  tight-
ness and looseness  of the two types  of guarantee.  The "tight" central-
ranges  guarantee  is  relatively  strong in  decisiveness of application  but
86  See Michelman,  supra  note 63, at  121-22.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
correspondingly  restricted  in scope of application. 87  The "loose" pub-
lic-reason guarantee  extends  to a much wider  range of politically de-
cidable matters, but at the cost of allowing in much more reasonable
disagreement about what is to be done.
The idea, surely, is to use the looser guarantee  to supplement the
tighter one, in hopes of combining them to produce, in sum, what we
need for legitimacy.  Constitutional  contractarians  hope to eke  out a
sufficient,  legitimating  constitutional  agreement  with  a  guarantee
that, for  all lawmaking  that raises  issues  affecting the  basic structure
of  society  but  falling  outside  the  culturally  incontestable  central
ranges of the basic  liberal guarantees, resolutions  of constitutionality
will be sought through sincere debate, invoking reasons addressed  to
some universally acceptable leading question or questions.
For purposes of our inquiry here, it does  not matter exactly what
we take the leading question to be."'  It is enough  to know that public
reason's  leading  question  in  any  liberal  contractarian  justificatory
project will  have  to be  rooted in commitments  to  individualism  and
civility89 -and  thus to values,  as  I wrote  above, of mutual and recipro-
cal  respect  and  regard among  persons  conceived  as reasonable  and
rational, equal and free, endowed with interests both in plotting a life
for oneself guided by one's own understanding of what gives value to
a  life,  and  in  recognizing  and  abiding  by fair  terms of cooperation
with others likewise  endowed.9 0  But now we can see that it must be in
service  to  those  same values  that the universally  rational and reason-
able constitution is to guarantee  the central ranges  of the basic liber-
ties:  Assuming,  then, that a country's  constitution  is  one that  can
carry  the  burden of  liberal  contractarian  political justification,  any
rights it enumerates  must be regarded  as islands  of relative  certainty
in a more open sea of debate (that is, of exchange  of public reasons)
over what rights the.legitimating constitution guarantees.
I think we can conclude  as follows.  First, no logical objection ap-
pears  to  the idea that constitutional  debate in  ordinary popular and
political  venues could measure up well enough  to an ideal  of public
87  See RAWLS,  supra note  61,  at 229,  296 (suggesting that the central ranges guarantee  derives
its strength from its limitation to only the most essential liberties).
88 According to John Rawls,  the right question  ultimately will be that of which  resolution of
the controverted  constitutional application  is the  more  conducive  to the end of the adequate
and full development  of certain  "moral powers,"  the development and exercise of which  can be
attributed as "higher-order interests" of every person.  See Frank I. Michelman,  Rawls on Constitu-
tionalism and Constitutional  Law, in THE  CAMBRIDGE  COMPANION  TO  RAWLS  394  (Samuel Free-
man ed.,  2003).
89  See supra text accompanying notes 63-68.
90  See id.
91  See RAWLS,  supra note  61,  at 297  (remarking  that the  "protection of this range  of applica-
tion  is a condition  of the adequate  development  and  full  exercise  of the ...  moral  powers  of
citizens as free and equal persons").
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reason  to  fill  out what Rawlsians  would  regard  as  a sufficient,  legiti-
mating constitutional agreement.  On that conceptual  point, we need
not be  fazed  by  Rawls's  characterization  of  the  Supreme  Court  as
(ideally) an "exemplar of public reason. 92
Second,  all constitutional-contractarian  constitutional  rights  are,
in  the last analysis, unenumerated.  Without exception, they are a de-
liverance  of the use of public reason  to decide the application, to ma-
jor public controversies  over limits  to governmental  power  and  dis-
cretion,  of principles  transcending  the  textual  formulations  in  any
empirical  constitution.  Those  islands of "enumeration"  turn out  to
be just  a  few  loci  of highly  predictable  convergence  among  public
reasoners.  They  are  not  "isolated  points  pricked  out  in  terms  of"
constitutional  clauses  but, rather,  high-visibility  outcroppings  of the
11  93 "rational  continuum"  that  is  forever  forming  beneath  the  waves.
Now,  obviously,  the  sort of argumentation  that "public reason"  con-
notes  does not coincide with  SLM,  on any  conception of SLM that's
remotely capable of differentiating legal from political or philosophi-
cal disputation-or, hence  (if my earlier argument is correct),  of dif-
ferentiating  "enumerated"  from  "unenumerated"  constitutional
rights.
And why,  then, should  I say that a constitutional-contractarian  ap-
proach  to  political justification  in  a democracy  has trouble with  talk
about unenumerated constitutional  rights?  Only because, as I argued
near the outset, you cannot engage in such talk without an anchorage
in minimal  legal formalism,  and that anchorage  cannot hold  against
the deeper tides of constitutional-contractarian  reason.  The "rights"
chapter  of  the  legitimacy-bearing  constitutional  quasi-contract  de-
volves  into  a commitment  to decide  claims of limits  and  constraints
on government  by and  only by  good-faith  application  of principles
that  transcend-although  they  are  in some  sense  represented  by-
whatever  textual formulations the chapter may contain.
92  Id. at 231.
93 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523  (1961)  (HarlanJ., dissenting).